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Abstract 
Research on mandated occupational role change focuses on jurisdictional conflict to explain 
change failure. Our study of the English National Health Service highlights the role of 
occupational dispositions in shaping how mandated role change is implemented by members of 
multiple occupational groups. We find that tension stemming from misaligned dispositions may 
emerge as members of different occupations interact during their role change implementation 
efforts. Depending on dispositional responses to tension, change may fail as members of the 
different occupations avoid interactions. This suggests that effective role change can be elusive 
even in the initial absence of conflicting occupational interests. 
Keywords: role change; occupational dispositions; healthcare management; inter-occupational 
relations 
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In professionalized settings, tasks and associated responsibilities are formally distributed across 
occupational groups. However, this distribution is not stable, as the highly professionalized 
healthcare field (Freidson, 2001) has witnessed over the past decades (Nancarrow & Borthwick, 
2005). For instance, quality-focused policies led to the creation of new quality-focused roles 
(Menchik & Meltzer, 2010; Timmermans, 2003; Wiener, 2000), while attempts to increase 
community-based care led to the establishment of new advanced practice nursing and allied 
health roles (Chreim et al., 2007; Reay et al., 2006). Such changes in occupational roles in 
healthcare are often an outcome of policy mandates (Allen, 2000; Kellogg, 2014; Nancarrow & 
Borthwick, 2005; Wiener, 2000). 
As emphasised by Abbott (1988), the implementation of policies designed to change 
occupational roles is not uniform. Occupations can resist, contest, or negotiate mandated role 
changes at a field level, shaping how they might be implemented (Anteby et al., 2016; Starr, 
1984). Additionally, interactions within and across occupations in the workplace can impact 
whether and how mandated changes are actually put into practice on the front-line (Allen, 2000; 
Givan, 2016; Kitchener, 2000; Wiedner et al., 2017). Dynamics in the workplace can ultimately 
prevent effective policy implementation (Givan, 2016; Kellogg, 2011).  
Prior research primarily focuses attention on jurisdictional conflict (Abbott, 1988)—i.e. 
conflict between professions for control over work tasks—as the mechanism that might explain 
whether policy initiatives and other field-level pressures result in changes in workplace-level 
occupational mandates and roles. For example, Allen (2000) demonstrates how jurisdictional 
conflict between nurses and doctors shaped the redefinition of occupational role relations in 
response to a range of policy initiatives in a hospital in the English National Health Service 
(NHS). She highlights the importance of jurisdictional conflict by showing that nursing 
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managers proactively defined new nursing roles in order to prevent medics from imposing them 
on nurses. Others similarly point to jurisdictional conflict as a mechanism shaping how roles are 
renegotiated in practice in response to policy initiatives (Kellogg, 2014; Nancarrow & 
Borthwick, 2005; Weinberg, 2004).  
While these studies provide valuable insights, they risk simplistically portraying individuals 
as rational actors whose actions and interactions are motivated by their jurisdictional interests. A 
broad range of research, however, suggests that the negotiation of occupational mandates and 
roles in the workplace is shaped by a wide range of factors, including local work demands 
(Nancarrow, 2015; Xyrichis, Lowton, & Rafferty, 2017), and work ethos (Fayard et al., 2017; 
Nelsen & Barley, 1997). By moving beyond jurisdictional conflict, scholars have focused 
attention on dispositions — the categories of perception and appreciation, gained through lived 
experience (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 11) — in shaping how members of an occupation 
think and act. As an important driver of how members of occupations interact (e.g. Oborn & 
Dawson, 2010), dispositions may be critical in shaping how mandated role changes are 
negotiated between members of different occupations in the workplace. All of this suggests that 
a focus on jurisdictional conflict alone may not fully explain why a mandated role change may or 
may not succeed. In particular, we still lack knowledge concerning how dynamics that are 
shaped by occupational dispositions rather than jurisdictional conflict can affect mandated role 
change implementation.  
In this paper, we present an inductive analysis of local responses to a policy designed to shift 
regional public healthcare budgeting responsibilities from public healthcare system 
administrators (known as ‘commissioners’) to local primary care physicians (known as ‘General 
Practitioners’ (GPs)) in the NHS, in order to further knowledge on how occupational dispositions 
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can inhibit mandated role change implementation. The policy initiative, known as ‘Liberating the 
NHS’, was described as the most fundamental restructuring in the organization’s sixty-year 
history (BBC News Online, 2012). Initiated with the rationale that financial decisions should be 
guided by a clinical perspective (DH, 2010, p. 1), the initiative mandated that primary care 
physicians across the country manage over 60% (approximately £60bn) of the total NHS budget. 
We find that differences in disposition across occupations can inhibit effective policy 
implementation even when members of the relevant occupational groups are initially eager to 
alter their roles. Our analysis suggests that the lack of effective policy implementation results 
from misaligned occupational dispositions as members of each group engage in actions that are 
interpreted negatively by members of the other occupational group. Dependent on their 
dispositions, these negative interpretations and judgments can lead members of each group to 
attempt to limit further inter-occupational interactions, inhibiting the implementation of the 
mandated role change. We extend prior research by highlighting the importance of occupational 
dispositions in shaping how mandated occupational role changes are negotiated on the ground.  
THEORETICAL CONTEXT 
Jurisdictional Conflict and Changes in Occupational Roles 
The overwhelming focus of prior research on the implementation of mandated role changes in 
the workplace is on the role of jurisdictional conflict in shaping whether or how role changes are 
implemented. Policy mandates can trigger both field-level jurisdictional conflict and workplace-
level conflict over the renegotiation of local occupational mandates and associated occupational 
roles. An occupational role is a set of expectations about who does what work, how work should 
be performed, and how someone in one occupational role will interact with others (Abbott, 1988; 
Freidson, 1988; Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009). An organization’s work is constituted through a 
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role system that is comprised of multiple, interdependent and interacting occupational roles 
(Abbott, 1988; Bechky, 2003). Due to the interdependent nature of roles, mandated change in 
one occupational role necessarily involves changes to other roles and thereby to the role system 
(Abbott, 1988; Eisenstadt et al., 1967; Turner, 1990). Given that different occupational groups in 
a role system are constantly competing for jurisdictional control over valuable or high-status 
tasks, changes in roles can trigger jurisdictional conflict.   
Extant research has highlighted the importance of jurisdictional conflict in contributing to 
diverse outcomes related to policy implementation (Ferlie et al., 2005; Kellogg, 2014; 
McDermott et al., 2013; Nigam et al., 2016). Moreover, jurisdictional concerns, or the effective 
ability to reduce status hierarchies across well-established jurisdictional boundaries, are also 
important in shaping the potential for coordination and conflict in multi-professional teams 
(Edmondson, 2003; Huq, Reay, & Chreim, 2017; Nancarrow et al., 2013; Xyrichis et al., 2017). 
Consistent with this broader body of research, studies on how mandated role changes are 
implemented in the workplace focus on the importance of jurisdictional conflict in shaping how 
policy implementation unfolds (Anteby et al., 2016). This work presupposes that members of the 
higher-status occupation within a particular role structure make a judgment about a policy 
initiative’s impact on their jurisdictional interests and, based on that judgment, either engage 
with implementing the policy or resist it (e.g. Kellogg, 2011; McNulty & Ferlie, 2004). For 
example, Currie, Finn and Martin (2010) show that physicians resisted a policy initiative that 
aimed to bring cancer genetics care into community-based settings by enhancing the nursing-
genetics role. Physicians continued to have expectations of a more traditional doctor-nurse 
working relationship, and subverted the policy by limiting the autonomy of the individuals who 
assumed the new nursing roles. Similarly, in a study of reforms related to the Affordable Care 
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Act, Kellogg (2014) shows that members of high status occupations resisted performing new 
tasks that they interpreted as requiring the acquisition of “information unrelated to their 
professional expertise” and/or as involving work practices that conflicted with their professional 
identity and interests. They were able to subvert the policy by not engaging with the mandated 
role changes. Alternatively, Chreim, Williams and Hinings (2007) demonstrate that primary care 
physicians judged that a policy initiative to move care towards an inter-disciplinary team model 
would advance their occupation-specific goals, and hence cooperated with the initiative to 
introduce new occupational roles within the primary care setting. In sum, research shows that 
concerns about jurisdictional interests can shape occupation members’ actions in a broad range 
of settings, including implementation of mandated role changes in the workplace. 
An exclusive focus on jurisdictional concerns, however, may be incomplete. While 
professions and professionals can and do act in ways that are interest-driven, this behavior is 
layered onto a more complex set of motivations and rationales that shape action. This may matter 
in shaping how members of an occupation act and interact in the workplace generally, and how 
they respond to mandated role change specifically. 
The Role of Occupational Dispositions in Implementing Mandated Role Change 
Potentially complementing a focus on jurisdictional conflict, a large but disparate body of 
research suggests that occupational dispositions — which structure or guide members’ 
interpretations and habitual actions (Bourdieu, 1985) — shape how professions act and interact 
(Anteby et al., 2016; Bosk, 2003; DiBenigno, 2018; Hughes, 1981). According to Hughes, 
“[l]iterature and common sense … have given us stereotyped pictures of persons engaged in 
various occupations: the old-maid school teacher, the parson, the village blacksmith, the farmer, 
the professor, the politician, the financier. All these and many other types so created are expected 
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to react to the situations of life in a characteristic manner” (Hughes, 1981, p. 24). He describes 
the distinctive culture and technique of a person’s occupation as appearing in the individual as 
personal traits. These occupational dispositions are inculcated through processes of occupational 
training and socialization (Bosk, 2003; Hughes, 1981; Pratt et al., 2006). 
Occupational dispositions become an engrained and habitual way of interpreting the world. 
For example, engineers routinely view organizations as machines (Morgan, 1986). According to 
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), distinct work patterns manifest themselves in different goal and 
temporal orientations within organizations, such as between sales representatives and members 
of R&D teams. Dougherty (1992) encapsulates the idea of occupational dispositions in noting 
that members of differing occupations, even when forming part of the same organization, inhabit 
different “thought worlds”.   
In shaping worldviews, occupational dispositions can structure how members of an 
occupation behave as part of their routine work and beyond. For instance, in a study of 
clinicians’ practices at a mental health clinic, Kirschner and Lachicotte observed supervision 
meetings in which matters were often left unresolved, mirroring the open-endedness of “the 
structure of psychodynamic therapy itself” (Kirschner & Lachicotte, 2001, p. 448). 
Moreover, occupational dispositions might shape how members of different occupational 
groups interact with one another. For example, Currie et al. (2010) show that nurses who are 
formally in charge of designing and implementing change may struggle when an initiative 
involves physicians, in part because their dispositions may prevent them from challenging 
higher-status medical professionals. Wiedner and colleagues (2017) witnessed similar dynamics 
with regard to primary care physicians struggling to implement changes to local healthcare 
services due to being deferential to higher-status hospital consultants. By contrast, Pouthier 
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(2017) suggests that shared dispositions, exemplified by shared identification rituals involving 
joking and griping, can enable coordination in cross-professional teams delivering palliative care 
to cancer patients. In this case, shared dispositions develop across occupations within a specialty 
area (palliative care), and differ from the dispositions in other specialty areas (e.g. acute care).  
As an important driver of how members of an occupational group will behave and, 
specifically, interact with others, occupational dispositions are likely to play a role in how 
mandated role changes are negotiated. A dispositional focus, then, may complement the focus on 
jurisdictional concerns that predominates prior research. Given the lack of research examining 
dispositions in processes of implementing mandated role change, we thus address the research 
question: How do occupational dispositions impact interactions between members of different 
occupational groups in the process of mandated role implementation? 
METHODS 
This paper is based on an ethnographically-informed, in-depth single case study, which is 
appropriate to gain insights concerning a phenomenon that has remained under-theorized (Ozcan 
et al., 2017; Yin, 2003). Our qualitative study concerning mandated occupational role change in 
the NHS started in 2010 in response to the government’s announcement of a policy to radically 
restructure how the public healthcare system was managed. The policy involved shifting 
responsibilities for managing local public healthcare budgets from administrators to GPs. 
This was not the first effort to engage GPs in managing public healthcare budgets. Around 
twenty years earlier, GPs across the country had been given opportunities to make certain budget 
allocation decisions, which were initially restricted to non-urgent elective and community care. 
However, ‘GP fundholding’ was abolished after only six years. Subsequent attempts to engage 
GPs in healthcare systems management included the national ‘practice-based commissioning’ 
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policy (in 2004) that allowed GPs to advise local healthcare management agencies on budget 
allocations. Yet, these agencies, which were largely staffed by non-medically trained 
administrators, maintained responsibility for healthcare management decisions. 
Studying responses to a policy designed to radically change administrators’ and physicians’ 
responsibilities provides an extreme case with high revelatory potential (Siggelkow, 2007) for 
understanding dynamics that may occur following attempts to change an established multi-
occupational role structure. Unlike other cases of expanding physicians’ roles by increasing 
managerial duties (e.g. Kitchener, 2000), successfully implementing this radical change appeared 
to require the transfer of a complex and highly specialized body of knowledge from those who 
had been performing relevant tasks to those who were assuming responsibilities for them. It 
therefore required inter-occupational collaboration. 
We began by collecting data to help us understand public healthcare systems management 
(‘commissioning’) and how stakeholders reacted to the change policy. With regard to the former, 
we primarily reviewed academic literature (e.g. Flynn & Williams, 1997) and reports published 
by the UK government and relevant think tanks (e.g. Cohen & Light, 2003; DH, 2005; Woodin 
& Wade, 2007), and also interviewed a small number of administrators and clinicians across the 
country. Through interviews, along with articles from the media and trade journals (e.g. Dixon & 
Ham, 2010; HSJ, 2011), we sought to gauge responses to the policy. 
Our objective at this stage was to identify a relevant research site that would allow us to 
observe efforts to implement mandated role change. Given uncertainty about whether the policy 
would be implemented at all, we decided to focus on healthcare management agencies where 
administrators had started preparing for change and where local GPs appeared keen to assume 
commissioning responsibilities. 
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Having gained access to one such site, the first author received permission to conduct further 
interviews and attend management-related meetings. This was followed by two three-month 
periods of observations, in which the first author shadowed administrators (Czarniawska, 2007) 
for three to four full days a week to gain an in-depth understanding of how they were adjusting to 
the new policy and whether and how GPs were becoming more involved in commissioning-
related work. In total, the study involved three years in the field, from the initial interviews to 
identify a research site to interviews conducted after the two periods of observation. In this time 
we had conducted over 700 hours of direct observation, reviewed 20Gb of confidential 
documents, and completed a total of 66 semi-structured interviews with administrators in the 
region (42), local GPs (9 –all of whom initially expressed a desire in becoming involved in 
aspects of commissioning), and other stakeholders with some involvement in aspects of public 
healthcare management (15). In addition to semi-structured interviews, the first author also asked 
questions during periods of observation while attempting to minimize interference and disruption 
for participants. In this respect, informal chats with administrators and GPs before and directly 
after commissioning-related meetings were especially valuable. As the study progressed, we 
became intrigued by our observation that knowledge sharing was limited despite initial 
enthusiasm, and focused our analysis on understanding why. 
Our ongoing data collection and analysis proceeded iteratively, with emerging questions 
generating provisional answers, further data collection and further questions (Alvesson & 
Kärreman, 2007; Wiedner & Ansari, 2017). Through this process we identified inter-
occupational tension, and the negative judgments that both administrators and GPs formed of the 
other group in the course of negotiating new roles, as important. We then focused our efforts on 
identifying the specific sources of tension and actors’ responses. Repeatedly comparing our 
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emerging interpretations of the empirical data with theory (Mantere & Ketokivi, 2013), 
specifically an emergent focus on occupational dispositions, we progressively abstracted from 
our particular case to develop a theoretical model specifying how misaligned occupational 
dispositions may inhibit mandated role change implementation in practice. Examples of data for 
each of the themes that comprise our model are presented in the Appendix (Table 1). 
FINDINGS 
We found that implementing mandated role change involved members of the occupations whose 
roles were being altered interacting with one another to negotiate their new roles. These 
interactions were substantially influenced by the dispositions of the different occupational 
groups, which ultimately inhibited successful policy implementation. Figure 1 presents our 
model of relevant dynamics. It shows that the nature of GPs’ and administrators’ work and 
power relations shaped their occupational dispositions. While dispositions were principally 
shaped by long-standing work practices and established power relations, the latter were 
somewhat impacted by the mandated role change itself. These dispositions, in turn, shaped how 
members of each group interacted in their efforts to negotiate their new roles. The same 
dispositions, along with the degree of misalignment between them, influenced how members of 
each group interpreted and judged each-others’ actions. High misalignment between GPs’ and 
administrators’ dispositions generated tension in inter-occupational interactions, leading to 
negative judgments and interpretations. Both groups, in accordance with their dispositions, 
responded to emerging tension in ways that reduced further inter-occupational interaction. This 
contributed to a lack of transfer of commissioning-related activities to GPs, thereby inhibiting the 
implementation of the mandated role change and ultimately reinforcing the existing role system. 
We unpack these dynamics below. 
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--------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
--------------------------------------------- 
Occupational Dispositions 
Below we contrast each occupational group’s primary focus of interest, typical decision-making 
speed and routine enactment of discretion with one another. We also consider the immediate 
impact of the announcement of the mandated role change. 
GPs’ Dispositions 
GPs’ primary focus of interest at work concerns diagnosing individual patients, prescribing 
medicine and referring patients to relevant specialists. As a result, diseases, treatment methods, 
patients’ responses to them, and individual specialists are more meaningful for GPs than 
governance arrangements in the NHS. As one GP noted: 
Even if you have been working in the service like I was for all those years, it is 
amazing how you don't really care [about formal organizational structures]. 
Because you are focused on your insular little GP surgery world with one patient 
(GP #1, interview) 
This local focus was confirmed by another GP, who stated: 
You can care, as a GP, about the patient in front of you. You care about your 
practice. You can care about a bigger area, but as soon as it becomes too big, you 
don't care. (GP #6, interview) 
GPs’ routine work also affects their temporal orientations: GPs typically diagnose, decide on 
appropriate treatment methods, and write up a summary of their consultation in less than ten 
minutes (Carr-Hill et al., 1998). GPs therefore necessarily employ heuristics (Gabbay & le May, 
2004). 
Finally, GPs’ relative power vis-à-vis other occupations, specifically their possession of 
valued medical knowledge and status as independent contractors who own their practices, allow 
them to enact a relatively high degree of discretion. GPs exercise their professional judgment 
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when diagnosing patients and suggesting treatment options, arguing that their personal 
experiences with patients, medications and local specialist services enable them to provide 
nuanced treatment methods. As is the case with most professionalized occupations, GPs 
regularly resist attempts to limit their discretion: 
GPs don't like being managed … and we don't like being told. So [if someone] 
wants to change general practice, we say ‘bugger off!’ (GP #6, interview) 
The UK government’s announcement that GPs were going to assume responsibilities for 
managing regional healthcare budgets (DH, 2010, p. 27), in addition to previous reforms 
designed to encourage GPs’ input in commissioning, further signaled that GPs were trusted to 
make healthcare management-related decisions, reinforcing beliefs that GPs’ high level of 
discretion is appropriate. In giving them freedom to shape regional healthcare services, the 
mandated role change appeared to confirm GPs’ abilities to enact a high degree of discretion 
beyond their traditional professional role as clinicians. 
Administrators’ Dispositions 
In contrast to GPs’ attention to individual patients and treatment pathways, administrators 
focused their attention on the organizational structures and financial flows across the regional 
healthcare system. Much of their work involved monitoring expenditure, reviewing performance 
indicators and examining contracts negotiated with public and private organizations. During 
meetings, administrators routinely presented expenditure figures and inter-organizational 
disputes. The focus on these issues stemmed from the central role of contracts and financial 
pressures on administrators’ work. A particularly telling moment occurred when an administrator 
delivered an improvised leaving speech to her colleagues. After beginning to cry, she stated: “I 
do hope that I was able to get some money out of those contracts” (Administrator #22, 
observation notes). 
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Unlike GPs, who engaged in rapid, heuristic-based decision-making, administrators were used 
to being involved in several months-long decision-making processes. The need to follow national 
policies and regulations, coupled with lack of expertise concerning specialized healthcare 
services, resulted in decisions routinely requiring the input from a number of stakeholders across 
several hours-long meetings. This resulted in decisions, such as awarding or terminating a 
contract, taking up to a year. For instance, referring to an initiative to save money by no longer 
paying for an underutilized ward in a hospital, one administrator noted: 
We’ve got to go around the scrutiny committee and all the politicians, the local 
involvement network, all sorts of other things … you can’t just say this is what [we 
will do]. (Administrator #6, interview) 
Similarly, local healthcare needs assessments required inputs from several stakeholders and 
could take longer than six months. Administrators did not consider this slow. Rather, they were 
to be expected given “statutory obligations” (Administrator #5, interview). 
Finally, administrators’ lack of power limited their ability to enact discretion. Despite having 
formal responsibilities for managing budgets and thereby altering local services, administrators’ 
abilities to make decisions to shape the healthcare system were constrained. This was because 
their lack of clinical expertise limited their ability to evaluate local services and suggest changes. 
Furthermore, the existence of monopoly providers inhibited their ability to threaten the 
withdrawal of funding. Large hospitals, in particular, could rely on the media and politicians to 
come to their aid if they faced financial difficulties and to pressure local commissioners to 
continue to fund services even if they were unsustainable. As one administrator noted, “if the 
[commissioning organization] is ever in the media, then it’s negative: … ‘you’re a bunch of 
swines because you’re cutting [services]’” (Administrator #8, interview). Additionally, the 
increasing use of standard treatment episode charges reduced commissioners’ ability to negotiate 
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prices. Most of the evaluation criteria were also set at a national level, limiting monitoring 
activities to performance indicators and targets that administrators could not influence. 
Administrators consequently saw their roles as following procedures, implementing policies 
and trying to prevent the financially strained local healthcare system from collapsing by asking 
local providers for ways of increasing efficiency. As one administrator noted: 
What you’re doing is, you’ve got to deliver these centrally set targets, which 
actually cost more than the resources that you’ve got anyway … We don’t have the 
capacity or skills or leverage to make … major changes.  [We have] very little 
influence … Most of our work is in terms of working with people to plan or tweak 
the service models that we have and the pathways and how do we do that to save 
money, basically. (Administrator #3, interview) 
Overall, the limited ability to enact discretion manifested itself in behavior that could be 
described as “follow the leader, who’s also following his leaders and the SHA [Strategic Health 
Authority], and so on.” (Administrator #3, interview) 
Shifting commissioning responsibilities from administrators to GPs meant that the former 
were now officially assuming a supporting role for the latter. This shaped dispositions by 
reinforcing administrators’ deference to GPs, since the latter were no longer only associated with 
high status medical knowledge but also with directly affecting their careers. 
Dispositional Misalignment Leads to Negative Interpretations 
Occupational dispositions can shape actors’ actions and interpretations in settings beyond their 
everyday work. These settings include inter-occupational interactions in which details 
concerning policy implementation are negotiated and role transfer is initiated (see dark-shaded 
area in Figure 1). Dispositional misalignment leads certain actions to be interpreted as 
inappropriate, generating inter-occupational tension. 
The implementation of the mandated role change began with a group of administrators and 
GPs who were initially predisposed to making the initiative a success. Administrators invited 
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GPs to join them at internal commissioning meetings and meetings with external stakeholders. 
The GPs who chose to participate in the first implementation efforts were regarded as 
“evangelists” (Administrator #6, interview) who wanted to play an active role in transforming 
the local care system. However, through their interactions, administrators progressively 
developed a view of GPs as being ignorant and selfish and GPs judged administrators as being 
slow and inefficient. 
Differences between members of the two occupational groups became evident during 
commissioning meetings. For instance, in stark contrast to the norm of starting a meeting about 
five minutes past the official starting time to allow attendees to prepare themselves, we observed 
that occasionally GPs pushed for meetings to begin early to save time. Also, GPs at times 
interrupted and argued with administrators, checked their emails on their phones (“started 
playing with their blackberries” according to administrator #3), or simply left if they felt that 
their presence was not required. As one administrator noted: “I had a meeting the other day … 
where, after half an hour…, a GP [suddenly] said, ‘I don’t see what I’m doing here’ … and off 
he walked” (administrator #37, interview). 
GPs also did not hesitate to voice their opinions and propose solutions to what administrators 
perceived as highly complex problems that required extensive analysis and negotiation. As one 
administrator noticed, as costs concerning the redesign of a local service were being discussed, 
one GP remarked: “by the time this is implemented it will be down to us to do the 
commissioning and we’ll just spend the money intuitively” (administrator #14, interview). Using 
intuition contrasted sharply with administrators’ adherence to formal procedures. Additionally, in 
contrast to administrators’ focus on numbers that represented total volumes or averages to 
evaluate provider organizations, GPs at times discussed issues that their registered patients were 
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experiencing. Moreover, recognizing potential conflicts of interest did not deter GPs from 
making local healthcare management-related suggestions from which they appeared to 
personally benefit: 
I'm still at a loss as to why we don't integrate more [secondary health services] into 
general practice; yes, I am biased; I am a GP, but what the hell! (GP, observation 
notes) 
In Summary, GPs adopted a very direct and personal style, which was at odds with the 
diplomatic approaches characteristic of administrators. 
Despite a lack of visible conflict, administrators experienced tension. This tension arose 
“based on experience” of interacting with GPs, “not simply blind prejudice” about them 
(administrator #5, interview). Furthermore, this tension did not appear to stem from jurisdictional 
battles as administrators we interviewed largely approved of GPs having to take “ownership” 
(administrator #12) for unpopular decisions. 
Notably, administrators interpreted GPs’ behaviors in commissioning-related activities as 
potentially disruptive to their everyday work and the local healthcare system. Administrators 
especially complained about GPs’ inability to recognize their ignorance about the complexities 
involved in commissioning. For instance, referring to the above-mentioned GP’s comment on 
intuition, an administrator noted: 
You can’t really have a GP come out of a ten minute consultation and in five 
minutes, before the next one, get the facts and intuitively spend £200 million of tax 
payers’ money… They can’t be doing that. I think where this comes from is a 
remarkable arrogance. (Administrator #14, interview) 
Administrators’ interpretations of GPs failing to recognize their ignorance and thereby 
disrupting commissioning became evident in several interviews: 
A GP … told me the other day: ‘We run our own businesses, so of course we know 
how this works.’ Well, it's very different running a very small GP practice of four 
or five GPs, as opposed to a [multi-]million pound business! (Administrator #32, 
interview) 
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Provider representatives also interpreted GPs’ interjections in meetings as signaling “a sort of 
slight lack of awareness … as to how partial [their] knowledge actually is” (Clinical Director 
#2), with their use of simplistic analogies betraying the complexity of healthcare systems 
management: 
I specifically remember a meeting in which [one GP] started by talking about ‘let's think 
about the analogy of the kitchen. I want the kitchen, this is the budget I've got for it. You want to 
sell me this kitchen which has these units, these things and these things, but I don't like the color 
of these units’ … and we [an administrator and I] were looking at each other and thinking, ‘oh 
God!’ (Clinical Director #1)Administrators and other stakeholders also confided in interviews 
their worry about GPs’ apparent focus on their own practices, rather than thinking about 
implications of commissioning decisions for the entire region. One administrator (#5) 
commented that GPs’ general approach to commissioning amounted to stating “I have this skill 
and I’ll [provide this service] for this amount of money, so give me this money to do it”; [which 
indicated that they] “don’t seem able to separate their two roles: provider and commissioner”. 
Administrators deduced from their observations of GPs’ behavior that GPs were transferring 
their habitual ways of working to a setting where they were out of place, thereby “not bringing 
out the best in them” (administrator #42, interview), which, in turn, generated inter-occupational 
tension. As one administrator (#11) commented in an interview, “we are talking of two 
organizations with completely different styles; GPs coming in and working in a certain way that 
we are not accustomed to.” 
In line with their acceptance of highly-limited discretion based on their routine work, as well 
as the reinforcement of unequal power relations via the mandated change of commissioning 
responsibilities, administrators did not challenge GPs in meetings. As one administrator (#36) 
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noted in an interview, “managers become reserved when you are around a dominant GP because 
there is a sense of hierarchy and you are not meant to argue with your clinical lead.” A provider 
representative who witnessed such behavior referred to administrators as “bloody sycophants” 
(Clinical Director #1, interview). 
Administrators’ deference to GPs contributed to situations in which the former refused to be 
seen as guiding the latter, even when they evidently held relevant knowledge. For instance, at 
one meeting about organizational structures concerning community care provision, GPs asked 
the community care commissioner which option he would recommend. In response, the 
commissioner said he did “not want to influence” them and that “my view doesn't matter here. 
It's your decision” (observation notes). Similarly, administrators did not intervene when GPs 
agreed in a meeting to amend a contract with a local provider by adding a clause that was not 
legally enforceable (observation notes). Regarding administrators’ general lack of intervention, 
one administrator (#36) commented in an interview, that “you have to suck up to the clinicians, 
really. But it is frustrating when you can see that something is being done that isn't right.” 
Meanwhile, when asked in interviews to assess their meetings with administrators, several 
GPs used terms such as “a waste of time” and “pointless”. One commented about administrators’ 
adherence to standard procedures: “they have crap management … they were really the old-
school contract management” (GP#6). One GP (#8) noted that administrators, due to their lack of 
clinical experience, “have never seen [a] service [they commission] work and they don’t know 
what the pitfalls of it are”, adding that their routine and rigid “segregation” of tasks related to 
“finance, contracting, and [designing, as well as monitoring] clinical services” did not make 
sense. With regard to administrators’ inflexibility about re-scheduling meetings, one GP 
commented: 
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I asked [the administrators] to change them to Mondays, because I thought for the managers it 
doesn't really make much difference to them. And that caused some hoo-ha, as you heard, at the 
last meeting: “Oh, then we can't get the papers to you [on time]. and…” And I was thinking, 
“well why? You just release them the day before, as you do with any meeting.” (GP #2, 
interview)In interactions with one another, GPs and administrators largely enacted their 
traditional roles: GPs, who were used to high levels of discretion and making relatively quick 
decisions, displayed dominance and impatience. Given their traditional focus of attention on their 
registered patients, they also brought up issues that might only affect a small number of 
individuals or from which they could personally benefit. Meanwhile administrators—who were 
used to analyzing contracts and multi-million pound budgets, reaching decisions only after 
months of negotiation and deliberation, as well as implementing orders from those hierarchically 
above them— largely remained silent or referred to standard procedures. Interpreting each 
others’ behavior as inappropriate, members of both occupations experienced tension. 
Responding to Inter-Occupational Tension by Reducing Inter-Occupational Interaction 
In addition to contributing to potential inter-occupational tension, occupational dispositions also 
shape responses to tension. Administrators avoided tension by being deferential to GPs in public 
while also limiting GP involvement in their administrative work. GPs, in turn, responded by 
avoiding extensive involvement in activities with administrators who they came to perceive as 
wasting their time. Taken together, these responses had the effect of reducing inter-occupational 
interaction, as shown in our model. 
Responding to GPs’ apparent ignorance concerning commissioning, administrators could 
have attempted to educate them by exposing them to the complexity of commissioning tasks. 
However, given their interpretations of GPs as impatient, aggressive and unwilling to listen, in 
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conjunction with their own deference to higher-status GPs and their dependence on GPs for 
keeping local commissioning jobs, administrators generally concluded that “clearly you can't just 
tell GPs” how they ought to perform their new role (administrator #32, interview). 
Reluctant to directly challenge GPs, administrators adopted other methods of dealing with 
tension. In particular, they restricted GPs’ involvement in commissioning by directing them to 
particular types of meetings and splitting existing meetings into ‘operational’ (to which 
administrators occupying lower pay band positions were invited) and ‘strategic’ meetings (to 
which GPs and senior administrators were invited). Administrators justified this on the grounds 
of maximizing efficiency:  
A GP [said to me]: ‘I need to know everything you know!’ And I said …, ‘you 
don't need to know everything I know … Your career is as a GP. You have a huge 
skill set … You set the vision.’ (Administrator #42, interview) 
Administrators’ reluctance to reschedule operational meetings to allow GPs to attend without 
having to re-schedule some of their clinical work also limited GP involvement in commissioning 
activities. 
Administrators were especially keen for GPs to make use of their available time by attending 
public ‘scrutiny committee’ meetings in which politicians tended to ask difficult questions 
concerning how the local healthcare system was being managed. As one administrator (#3) 
commented, GPs were in a position to dismiss any criticism by stating “this [system] is better for 
the patients; what do you know about it?” While such meetings arguably provided learning 
opportunities for GPs about the political nature of budget allocation decisions, they did little in 
terms of increasing their understanding of the day-to-day work underlying them.  
Some administrators recognized that separating commissioning-related work into separate 
tasks, undertaken by different groups of individuals who rarely met each other, was ineffective. 
In fact, one administrator had made efforts to combine a few existing work streams. 
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Nevertheless, the same administrator (#6) also argued in an interview that GPs “are not going to 
sit in three hour contract meetings” and would not want to “deal with basic service issues … and 
all of that … because it takes longer than seven minutes, actually”. 
Finally, administrators persuaded GPs to use their valuable time as effectively as possible by 
focusing on a few “strategic priorities” (Administrator #13, ethnographic interview). As a result, 
GPs had to provide written justifications for any time spent on commissioning-related activities 
to their respective representatives. GPs who recognized that certain issues, such as redesigning 
community-based mental healthcare services, were complex and required lengthy negotiations 
with stakeholders, were unhappy with this arrangement. As a result, one GP (#5), who had been 
very active initially, withdrew from all commissioning-related activities after complaining about 
this attempt to limit his involvement. 
Administrators’ responses to tension by reducing interaction were consistent with their 
habitual ways of dealing with conflict. Notably, one administrator (#3) commented that instead 
of directly confronting issues, such as underperforming colleagues “we just work around them 
and everybody knows that.” 
Unlike administrators, GPs did not appear to be afraid of offending others (apart from higher-
status medical doctors) in inter-occupational meetings by being confrontational. However, they 
seemed to favor avoiding inter-occupational engagement as they became increasingly frustrated 
about their lack of perceived progress –or, in their own words, “got pissed off with the whole 
thing” (GP#7, interview). Rather than seeing interactions with administrators as opportunities for 
learning about commissioning, GPs increasingly seemed to think that “going to meetings” meant 
they had less time to “save lives” (GP #2, informal conversation). Their disposition to maximize 
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efficiency via quick interventions left little time for finding ways of developing inter-
occupational collaboration. 
Reduced Inter-occupational Interaction Inhibits Effective Role Change Implementation 
Finally, our model highlights that reducing inter-occupational interaction inhibits effective role 
change implementation. This is because shared understandings of how the new roles should be 
enacted are not developed. Consequently, the nature of work and power dependencies of the 
occupations involved may remain largely unchanged. 
In our case, GPs’ exposure to everyday commissioning activities remained limited as their 
involvement was directed to attendance at ‘strategic meetings’. As a result, four years after they 
had first been approached by administrators, GPs appeared to still have a rather limited 
understanding of the commissioning role. During interviews, GPs confessed they had difficulties 
interpreting certain management documents, not least due to the heavy use of acronyms that they 
were unable to decipher. One GP (#9) noted more than four years after the policy announcement 
that she still didn’t “know the details of contracting” in the NHS and wondered why it was so 
difficult compared to contracting in the private sector. 
GPs’ limited attendance of commissioning-related meetings contrasted with those of several 
administrators, who typically spent several days a week in back-to-back meetings. Asked 
whether going to so many meetings was a productive use of their time, one administrator (#37) 
noted that every meeting typically provided “a nugget of information” that resulted in learning 
something new and potentially consequential. Starved of these “nuggets of information”, GPs 
reinforced their views of administrators’ work as largely useless. 
Additionally, because most of the administrative work was performed outside of the few 
meetings that GPs attended, GPs began having doubts about their ability to influence decisions. 
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One GP (#8, interview) complained about an “illusion of choice” that administrators presented to 
GPs, when in fact they had decided beforehand how to proceed. Meanwhile, administrators’ 
views of GPs as simply being unable to understand their work were also reinforced due to GPs’ 
limited learning, with one noting, “they understand their world [but] trying to get them to 
understand a different world is really quite difficult” (administrator #29, interview). 
In summary, by directing GPs to a very limited number of specific types of commissioning-
related activities, administrators inhibited GPs’ ability to understand and perform certain tasks 
that comprised their extended roles. This was reinforced by GPs’ withdrawal due to frustration 
concerning administrators’ apparent lack of guidance and flexibility. GPs’ existing roles, 
including their role-specific worldviews, were thereby left largely unchanged. Administrators 
consequently predicted that public healthcare commissioning would “go on much as before” 
(administrator #3, interview). 
These findings are consistent with other studies that have sought to evaluate GP-led 
commissioning across the UK. In particular, they support McDermott and colleagues’ claim that 
GPs can only “add value” to healthcare commissioning if extensive “time and effort” has been 
invested “in preparing those involved” to ensure “that they systematically gather evidence about 
service gaps and problems.” (2017, p.10). They also support the observation made by the same 
researchers that GPs have limited their engagement in certain commissioning-related activities 
based on perceptions that they “are not a good use of GP time” (2017, p. 8). Importantly, this 
paper adds insights into how this preparation and engagement may fail to emerge by 
foregrounding the role of misaligned occupational dispositions in shaping inter-occupational 
interactions. 
Departures from the Model 
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The narrative above may give the impression that occupational dispositions created strong 
misalignment between every GP and every administrator, triggering universal resentment and a 
complete unwillingness to collaborate. While our model reflects the predominant themes 
emanating from our analysis, we did witness a few outliers that suggest that occupational 
misalignment varies in practice, and that interventions designed to change the above described 
dynamics could succeed. 
With regard to occupational misalignment, we noticed that a small number of semi-retired 
GPs appeared to be more accepting of administrators’ work style, including lengthy meetings 
and rigid procedures. These few GPs continued to attend commissioning-related meetings until 
we stopped collecting data. Apart from these individuals simply having more time to engage in 
non-clinical work, as well as their desire to reduce their routine clinical work by “learning new 
skills” (GP #1, interview), their continued inter-occupational interaction may be attributable to 
their previous work in GP fundholding and engagement with administrators in relation to earlier 
reforms. In other words, their experiences may have reduced the occupational misalignment 
between themselves and administrators. 
With regard to possible interventions, GPs’ reflections on their experiences in interviews are 
potentially instructive. For instance, one GP (#7) commented that due to GPs being used to 
having a high degree of autonomy, “they are always able to speak their minds. So, that is a 
strength … but it also means that if they are not self-disciplined and sensitive enough, you can 
end up with dysfunctional meetings.” Another GP (#9) concurred that her colleagues could be 
quite aggressive, stating, “that is very true. I have seen that … and they might not really know 
what they are talking about.” Yet another GP (#6) admitted that her own behavior had been 
problematic (or had made her look “like a complete idiot” in her words), as she later, when 
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taking part in a leadership training program, came to realize. These comments suggest that 
increased awareness of how one’s behaviors may be interpreted by members of another 
occupation may help in preventing the build-up of inter-occupational tension. At the same time, 
the interviews also highlight how difficult it may be to change strongly internalized occupational 
dispositions, with GP#6 noting that despite increased self-awareness, “it is too late [for me] to 
change, sorry… If I had done it [leadership training] ten years ago, I might've been able to 
modify my behavior. By then it was too late.” 
DISCUSSION 
We examined how occupational dispositions may contribute to inhibiting mandated role change 
implementation. Our findings suggest that misaligned occupational dispositions may lead to the 
emergence of inter-occupational tension, which actors address by reducing inter-occupational 
interaction, thereby undermining actors’ abilities to effectively alter their roles. In demonstrating 
the importance of misaligned dispositions in inhibiting mandated role change implementation, 
our findings provide an alternative to the predominant view that role change is primarily 
dependent on the outcomes of jurisdictional battles between occupational groups (Abbott, 1988). 
Attributing change implementation dynamics to occupational dispositions departs from a 
model of human motivation and action that is grounded in rationality and protection of self- 
and/or group-interests (Coleman, 2009). This rational actor model is either implicit or explicit in 
accounts focused on jurisdictional conflict (Abbott, 1988) as well as much of the broader 
sociological literature on professions and professional work (Freidson, 1988; Starr, 1984), and 
has been a subject of some prior critique (Eyal, 2013). While our findings do not deny the 
potential relevance of such interests, we argue that foregrounding non-reflective habitual 
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behaviour in inter-occupational interactions adds important insights about mandated role change 
implementation that would otherwise remain hidden. 
CONCLUSION 
Given the broad importance of dispositions in shaping social interaction across a wide range of 
domains and contexts (Bourdieu, 1985), we anticipate that dispositions would play a 
complementary role to jurisdictional disputes in shaping the implementation of a broad range of 
mandated role changes. However, there are boundary conditions defining where dispositions 
might be more likely to feature prominently. Dispositions may be particularly useful for 
understanding the difficulty of effectively implementing change in situations where actors do not 
feel that their occupational interests are being threatened. This can include cases where mandated 
role changes give higher-status occupations opportunities to hive off lower-status scut-work 
(Huising, 2015). In our case, the policy of granting healthcare systems management 
responsibilities to GPs appeared to trigger minimal jurisdictional conflict between them and 
administrators because the former were not losing control over their clinical domain and 
administrators had limited control over their local healthcare system anyway.  
Dispositions and how they shape interactions may also be relatively more important when 
implementing mandated role change creates situations involving members of different 
occupational groups that do not habitually interact. Our paper examines the role of non-
professionals who normally interact infrequently with clinicians. In doing so, we develop a 
contrast to traditional depictions of professionals as being in a position to resist and subvert 
change (e.g. Givan, 2016; Kellogg, 2011) and administrators as mere implementers (Lipsky, 
1983). Instead, we find that the latter may (perhaps unintentionally) play a role in inhibiting 
change. Yet, our focus on interactions involving administrators raises the question of whether 
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this occupational group is in some ways unique or non-comparable to lower-status clinical 
professionals. Would we expect the dynamics we identified to emerge in the context of mandated 
role change involving physicians and nurses? Arguably, due to somewhat shared educational 
experiences, the degree of dispositional misalignment between different types of clinicians is 
generally lower than between clinicians and non-clinicians, potentially reducing the number of 
situations in which actors judge each-others’ behaviour as inappropriate. Moreover, physicians’ 
and nurses’ experiences of working together in their day-to-day work is likely to contribute to 
shared understandings (Brown & Duguid, 1991) that may prevent the build-up of inter-
occupational tension.  
In summary, while we argue that our model is transferable to other settings, the difference 
between GPs and administrators may represent an extreme case of dispositional misalignment 
that results in inter-occupational tension becoming particularly salient. We call for more 
empirical studies of mandated role change implementation involving diverse occupational groups 
to assess the transferability of our model. 
Our findings also have implications concerning the managerialization of professional work 
and professionals’ experiences of assuming increased administrative and managerial 
responsibilities (Waring & Currie, 2009). Much of this literature focuses on the individuals who 
experience transitions to managerial roles and the identity-related tension that results from 
adopting multiple, potentially conflicting roles  (McGivern et al., 2015). Additionally, the risk of 
clinicians being ostracized by members of their own occupational group once they assume 
managerial roles has been documented (Thorne, 1997). Our case instead highlights that 
challenges may arise even when professionals seem eager to assume aspects of non-professional 
work – and that success may depend on how inter-occupational interactions evolve. 
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Additionally, our analysis presents an interesting contrast to prevailing assumptions about the 
impact of change initiatives on dispositions. Specifically, mandated changes are often theorized 
as causing disruptions that call into question traditional behaviours (Kotter, 1995). In other 
words, actors may become aware of how their dispositions are no longer aligned with their 
environment, triggering adjustments. Alternatively, dispositions may simply fail to adapt to 
changing circumstances (Strand & Lizardo, 2017). Our analysis suggests a further possibility, 
namely that mandated changes may reinforce existing dispositions – such as a shift in 
responsibilities confirming GPs’, and denying administrators’, abilities to enact discretion. This 
finding has important implications for understanding unanticipated consequences of change 
initiatives (Balogun, 2006; McKinley & Scherer, 2000; Wiedner et al., 2017) and why 
supposedly radical change initiatives may represent continuity (Brunsson, 2009). 
Finally, beyond its theoretical significance in terms of understanding mandated change 
implementation processes, our focus on the importance of disposition and dispositional mis-
alignment has important implications for policy design and implementation. As reflective 
comments from GPs in our findings show, actors’ increased awareness of (1) their own 
dispositions, (2) how their behaviour may be interpreted negatively by others, and (3) how this 
may ultimately contribute to undermining desired change efforts, can support the suppression of 
actions that may generate inter-occupational tension. This suggests that efforts to implement role 
changes may need to focus on supporting actors’ self-awareness, empathy and reflexivity, so as 
to minimize the potential for inter-occupational tension to develop, as well as to help actors 
constructively deal with tension once it has emerged.  
Via our analysis of local responses to the policy of shifting healthcare systems management 
responsibilities from administrators to GPs in the NHS, we have shown that misaligned 
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occupational dispositions may contribute to inhibiting mandated role change implementation due 
to the build-up of inter-occupational tension. By highlighting the role of occupational 
dispositions in shaping the negotiation of mandated role change implementation between 
members of different occupations, we add important insights to role changes in professionalized 
settings in general, and healthcare systems management in particular. 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
We wish to thank Ariel Avgar, Dan Cornfield and the anonymous reviewers for their valuable 
comments and guidance. We also thank the participants at the Consequences of Change in 
Healthcare for Organizations, Workers, and Patients Conference and at the Tenth International 
Symposium on Process Organization Studies for their insightful feedback and suggestions on 
earlier versions of this manuscript. 
 
DECLARATION OF CONFLICTING INTERESTS 
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, 
and/or publication of this article. 
 
FUNDING 
Rene Wiedner was funded by the U.K. National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) 
Collaborations for Leadership in Applied Health Research and Care (CLAHRC) Cambridgeshire 
& Peterborough. The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the authors and not 
necessarily those of the National Health Service in England, the NIHR, or the U.K. 
Government’s Department of Health. 
31 
 
REFERENCES 
Abbott, A. (1988). The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labour. University of 
Chicago Press. 
Allen, D. (2000). Doing Occupational Demarcation The “Boundary-Work” of Nurse Managers in a 
District General Hospital. Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 29(3), 326–356. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/089124100129023936 
Alvesson, M., & Kärreman, D. (2007). Constructing Mystery: Empirical Matters in Theory Development. 
The Academy of Management Review, 32(4), 1265–1281. https://doi.org/10.2307/20159366 
Anteby, M., Chan, C. K., & DiBenigno, J. (2016). Three Lenses on Occupations and Professions in 
Organizations: Becoming, Doing, and Relating. The Academy of Management Annals, 10(1), 
183–244. https://doi.org/10.1080/19416520.2016.1120962 
Balogun, J. (2006). Managing Change: Steering a Course between Intended Strategies and Unanticipated 
Outcomes. Long Range Planning, 39(1), 29–49. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lrp.2005.02.010 
BBC News Online. (2012). Which is the world’s biggest employer? 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-17429786 
Bechky, B. A. (2003). Sharing meaning across occupational communities: The transformation of   
understanding on a production floor. Organization Science, 14(3), 312–330. 
https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.14.3.312.15162 
Bosk, C. L. L. (2003). Forgive and Remember: Managing Medical Failure, 2nd Edition (2nd ed. edition). 
University of Chicago Press. 
Bourdieu, P. (1985). Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. Harvard University Press. 
Bourdieu, P., & Wacquant, L. J. D. (1992). An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (1st ed.). University Of 
Chicago Press. 
Brown, J. S., & Duguid, P. (1991). Organizational learning and communities-of-practice: Toward a 
unified way of working, learning, and innovation. Organization Science, 2(1), 40–57. 
https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2.1.40 
Brunsson, N. (2009). Reform as Routine: Organizational Change and Stability in the Modern World. 
OUP Oxford. 
Carr-Hill, R., Jenkins-Clarke, S., Dixon, P., & Pringle, M. (1998). Do Minutes Count? Consultation 
Lengths in General Practice. Journal of Health Services Research & Policy, 3(4), 207–213. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/135581969800300405 
Chreim, S., Williams, B. E. (Bernie), & Hinings, C. R. (Bob). (2007). INTERLEVEL INFLUENCES ON 
THE RECONSTRUCTION OF PROFESSIONAL ROLE IDENTITY. Academy of Management 
Journal, 50(6), 1515–1539. https://doi.org/10.5465/AMJ.2007.28226248 
Cohen, A., & Light, D. (2003). Policy Paper 1: Commissioning Mental Health Services: Experiences 
from the USA. The Sainsbury Centre for Mental Health. 
http://www.centreformentalhealth.org.uk/publications/commissioning_mh_services.aspx?ID=341 
Coleman, J. (2009). Individual Interests and Collective Action: Studies in Rationality and Social Change 
(1 edition). Cambridge University Press. 
Currie, G., Finn, R., & Martin, G. (2010). Role Transition and the Interaction of Relational and Social 
Identity: New Nursing Roles in the English NHS. Organization Studies, 31(7), 941–961. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840610373199 
Czarniawska, B. (2007). Shadowing: And Other Techniques for Doing Fieldwork in Modern Societies. 
Copenhagen Business School Press. 
DH. (2005). COMMISSIONING A PATIENT-LED NHS. Department of Health. 
DH. (2010). Equity and excellence: Liberating the NHS (White Paper). 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/
DH_117353 
32 
 
DiBenigno, J. (2018). Anchored Personalization in Managing Goal Conflict between Professional 
Groups: The Case of U.S. Army Mental Health Care. Administrative Science Quarterly, 63(3), 
526–569. https://doi.org/10.1177/0001839217714024 
Dixon, A., & Ham, C. (2010). ‘Liberating the NHS’: The right prescription in a cold climate? King’s 
Fund. www.kingsfund.org.uk/sites/files/kf/field/field_publication_file/ liberating-nhs-right-
prescription-cold-climate-oct10.pdf 
Edmondson, A. C. (2003). Speaking Up in the Operating Room: How Team Leaders Promote Learning in 
Interdisciplinary Action Teams. Journal of Management Studies, 40(6), 1419–1452. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6486.00386 
Eisenstadt, S. N., Bar-Yosef, R., & Alder, C. (1967). Analysis of Processes of Role Change (1 edition). 
Routledge. 
Eyal, G. (2013). For a Sociology of Expertise: The Social Origins of the Autism Epidemic. American 
Journal of Sociology, 118(4), 863–907. https://doi.org/10.1086/668448 
Fayard, A.-L., Stigliani, I., & Bechky, B. A. (2017). How Nascent Occupations Construct a Mandate: The 
Case of Service Designers’ Ethos. Administrative Science Quarterly, 62(2), 270–303. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0001839216665805 
Ferlie, E., Fitzgerald, L., Wood, M., & Hawkins, C. (2005). The nonspread of innovations: The mediating 
role of professionals. Academy of Management Journal, 48(1), 117–134. 
Flynn, R., & Williams, G. (1997). Contracting for Health. In R. Flynn & G. Williams (Eds.), Contracting 
for health: Quasi-markets and the National Health Service (pp. 1–13). Oxford University Press. 
Freidson, E. (1988). Profession of Medicine: A Study of the Sociology of Applied Knowledge (Univ of 
Chicago PR ed. edition). University of Chicago Press. 
Freidson, E. (2001). Professionalism, the Third Logic. Polity Press. 
Gabbay, J., & le May, A. (2004). Evidence based guidelines or collectively constructed ‘mindlines?’—
Ethnographic study of knowledge management in primary care. British Medical Journal, 
329(7473), 1013-1016A. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.329.7473.1013 
Givan, R. K. (2016). The Challenge to Change: Reforming Health Care on the Front Line in the United 
States and the United Kingdom. ILR Press. 
HSJ. (2011). GP conflicts of interest could ‘badly undermine’ confidence in NHS. Health Service 
Journal. http://www.hsj.co.uk/home/commissioning/gp-conflicts-of-interest-could-badly-
undermine-confidence-in-nhs/5035381.article# 
Hughes, E. C. (1981). Men and Their Work. Greenwood Press. 
Huising, R. (2015). To Hive or to Hold? Producing Professional Authority through Scut Work. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 60(2), 263–299. https://doi.org/10.1177/0001839214560743 
Huq, J.-L., Reay, T., & Chreim, S. (2017). Protecting the Paradox of Interprofessional Collaboration. 
Organization Studies, 38(3–4), 513–538. https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840616640847 
Kellogg, K. C. (2011). Challenging Operations: Medical Reform And Resistance In Surgery. University 
of Chicago Press. 
Kellogg, K. C. (2014). Brokerage Professions and Implementing Reform in an Age of Experts. American 
Sociological Review, 79(5), 912–941. JSTOR. 
Kirschner, S. R., & Lachicotte, W. S. (2001). Managing Managed Care: Habitus, Hysteresis and the 
End(s) of Psychotherapy. Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry, 25(4), 441–456. 
Kitchener, M. (2000). The `Bureaucratization’ of Professional Roles: The Case of Clinical Directors in 
UK Hospitals. Organization, 7(1), 129–154. https://doi.org/10.1177/135050840071007 
Kotter, J. P. (1995). Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail. Harvard Business Review, 73(2), 
59–67. 
Lipsky, M. (1983). Street-Level Bureaucracy: The Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Service. Russell 
Sage Foundation. 
Mantere, S., & Ketokivi, M. (2013). Reasoning in Organization Science. Academy of Management 
Review, 38(1), 70–89. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2011.0188 
33 
 
McDermott, A. M., Fitzgerald, L., & Buchanan, D. A. (2013). Beyond Acceptance and Resistance: 
Entrepreneurial Change Agency Responses in Policy Implementation. British Journal of 
Management, 24, 93–115. 
McGivern, G., Currie, G., Ferlie, E., Fitzgerald, L., & Waring, J. (2015). Hybrid Manager-Professionals’ 
Identity Work: The Maintenance and Hybridization of Medical Professionalism in Managerial 
Contexts. Public Administration, 93(2), 412–432. https://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12119 
McKinley, W., & Scherer, A. G. (2000). Some Unanticipated Consequences of Organizational 
Restructuring. The Academy of Management Review, 25(4), 735–752. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/259202 
McNulty, T., & Ferlie, E. (2004). Process Transformation: Limitations to Radical Organizational Change 
within                 Public Service Organizations. Organization Studies, 25(8), 1389–1412. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840604046349 
Menchik, D. A., & Meltzer, D. O. (2010). The Cultivation of Esteem and Retrieval of Scientific 
Knowledge in Physician Networks. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 51(2), 137–152. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022146510372231 
Nancarrow, S. A. (2015). Six principles to enhance health workforce flexibility. Human Resources for 
Health, 13(1), 9. https://doi.org/10.1186/1478-4491-13-9 
Nancarrow, S. A., Booth, A., Ariss, S., Smith, T., Enderby, P., & Roots, A. (2013). Ten principles of 
good interdisciplinary team work. Human Resources for Health, 11(1), 19. 
https://doi.org/10.1186/1478-4491-11-19 
Nancarrow, S. A., & Borthwick, A. M. (2005). Dynamic professional boundaries in the healthcare 
workforce. Sociology of Health & Illness, 27(7), 897–919. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
9566.2005.00463.x 
Nelsen, B. J., & Barley, S. R. (1997). For Love or Money? Commodification and the Construction of an 
Occupational Mandate. Administrative Science Quarterly, 42(4), 619–653. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2393652 
Nigam, A., Huising, R., & Golden, B. (2016). Explaining the Selection of Routines for Change during 
Organizational Search. Administrative Science Quarterly, 61(4), 551–583. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0001839216653712 
Oborn, E., & Dawson, S. (2010). Learning across Communities of Practice: An Examination of   
Multidisciplinary Work. British Journal of Management, 21(4), 843–858. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8551.2009.00684.x 
Okhuysen, G. A., & Bechky, B. A. (2009). Coordination in Organizations: An Integrative Perspective. 
The Academy of Management Annals, 3(1), 463–502. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/19416520903047533 
Ozcan, P., Han, S., & Graebner, M. E. (2017). Single Cases: The What, Why, and How. In R. Mir & S. 
Jain (Eds.), The Routledge Companion to Qualitative Research in Organization Studies (pp. 92–
112). Routledge. 
Pouthier, V. (2017). Griping and Joking as Identification Rituals and Tools for Engagement in Cross-
Boundary Team Meetings. Organization Studies, 38(6), 753–774. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840616685358 
Pratt, M. G., Rockmann, K. W., & Kaufmann, J. B. (2006). Constructing Professional Identity: The Role 
of Work and Identity Learning Cycles in the Customization of Identity Among Medical 
Residents. Academy of Management Journal, 49(2), 235–262. 
https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2006.20786060 
Reay, T., Golden-Biddle, K., & Germann, K. (2006). Legitimizing a new role: Small wins and 
microprocesses of change. Academy of Management Journal, 49(5), 977–998. 
Siggelkow, N. (2007). Persuasion with case studies. Academy of Management Journal, 50(1), 20–24. 
Starr, P. (1984). The Social Transformation of American Medicine: The Rise Of A Sovereign Profession 
And The Making Of A Vast Industry (Reprint edition). Basic Books. 
34 
 
Strand, M., & Lizardo, O. (2017). The Hysteresis Effect: Theorizing Mismatch in Action. Journal for the 
Theory of Social Behaviour, 47(2), 164–194. https://doi.org/10.1111/jtsb.12117 
Thorne, M. L. (1997). Being a Clinical Director: First among Equals or Just a Go-Between? Health 
Services Management Research, 10(4), 205–215. https://doi.org/10.1177/095148489701000401 
Timmermans, S. (2003). The gold standard: The challenge of evidence-based medicine and 
standardization in health care. Temple University Press. 
Turner, R. H. (1990). Role Change. Annual Review of Sociology, 16(1), 87–110. 
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.so.16.080190.000511 
Waring, J., & Currie, G. (2009). Managing Expert Knowledge: Organizational Challenges and 
Managerial   Futures for the UK Medical Profession. Organization Studies, 30(7), 755–778. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840609104819 
Weinberg, D. B. (2004). Code Green: Money-Driven Hospitals and the Dismantling of Nursing. ILR 
Press. 
Wiedner, R., & Ansari, S. (2017). Appreciating Emergence and Serendipity in Qualitative Research: 
Resisting the Urge to Follow Set Plans. In R. Mir & S. Jain (Eds.), The Routledge Companion to 
Qualitative Research in Organization Studies (pp. 343–357). Routledge. 
Wiedner, R., Barrett, M., & Oborn, E. (2017). The Emergence of Change in Unexpected Places: 
Resourcing across organizational practices in strategic change. Academy of Management Journal, 
60(3), 823–854. 
Wiener, C. (2000). The Elusive Quest: Accountability in Hospitals (1 edition). Aldine Transaction. 
Woodin, J., & Wade, E. (2007). Towards World Class Commissioning Competency: A Report Produced 
for West Midlands Strategic Health Authority. University of Birmingham. 
Xyrichis, A., Lowton, K., & Rafferty, A. M. (2017). Accomplishing professional jurisdiction in intensive 
care: An ethnographic study of three units. Social Science & Medicine, 181, 102–111. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2017.03.047 
Yin, R. K. (2003). Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Third Edition). Sage. 
 
AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES 
Rene Wiedner is an associate professor and a member of the Process, Practice and Institutions 
(PPI) Research Programme at Warwick Business School, University of Warwick. His research 
focuses on change, collaboration, and innovation, mainly in healthcare and the creative 
industries. He received his PhD from the University of Cambridge. 
Amit Nigam is Professor of Management at Cass Business School, City, University of London. 
His research focuses on processes of organizational and institutional change, primarily in 
healthcare. He is particularly interested in the social dynamics within and across professions 
during change. 
Jose Bento da Silva is Assistant Professor of Organisation Studies at Warwick Business School, 
University of Warwick. His research focuses on institutions and institutionalization processes.  
35 
 
APPENDIX 
Figure 1: The Role of Occupational Dispositions in Inhibiting Mandated Role Change 
Implementation 
 
Occupational Group A:
• Nature of work
• Power dependencies
Occupational Group B:
• Nature of work
• Power dependencies
Occupational 
dispositions
Occupational 
dispositions
Figure 2: Inhibiting mandated role change implementation
Responding to inter-occupational tension by reducing 
inter-occupational interaction
Lack of effective role change implementation
Mandated role change
Enacting dispositions in inter-occupational interactions
Interpreting and judging others’ behaviour as 
inappropriate generates inter-occupational 
tension
Degree of dispositional 
misalignment
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Online Appendix 1: Supporting Evidence for Each Theme 
Aggregate Theme Supporting Evidence (examples) 
Occupational 
dispositions 
Focus of 
attention: GPs 
focus on 
individual cases 
and own 
practice 
“I have often likened them [GPs] to schools. Schools really, 
generally, are concerned about their population, their pupils, 
and what goes on in that building, and whatever. They are not 
really particularly worried when people leave the front gate. 
Schools would deny that, and GPs are the same.” 
(Administrator, interview) 
 
“I think there is a disparity between what GPs want and what 
others think GPs want … What floats my boat is dealing with 
the day job [rather than trying to improve the healthcare 
system]” (GP, observation notes) 
Focus of 
attention: 
Administrators 
focus on large 
organizations, 
contracts and 
regional 
healthcare 
system 
“[In terms of the day to day work] we could be discussing 
consultations, like we are at the moment with [a large provider 
organization]; there could be … meetings to discuss contract 
performance and how they're going to develop and whether 
we’re going to change those formats in the future.” 
(Administrator, interview) 
 
“We do a lot of work with public health in terms of them 
looking at data and it kind of identifies gaps and priorities 
which you try and move forward but you are very much 
constrained by this is the resource, this is the service models 
that are wanted nationally and are proven to be fair, and 
you’re just really monitoring the implementation of that.” 
(Administrator, interview) 
Decision-
making speed: 
GPs used to 
making quick 
decisions 
“This GP explained [that], ‘we have ten minutes to see a 
patient; we have ten minutes in which to greet them; listen to 
their version of what they think is wrong with them; make a 
diagnosis of what is the most likely thing that is wrong with 
them; work out what we’re going to prescribe or where we’re 
going to refer to; write all that up; input into the computer if 
need be; get them out the door; and write up our notes ready 
for the next patient coming in.” (Administrator, interview) 
 
“You present them [GPs] with a problem; there’s no crap 
about it and they just give you an answer in seven minutes” 
(Administrator, interview) 
Decision-
making speed: 
Administrators 
used to slow 
decisions 
“[Things have] to be done very much by negotiation and 
persuasion and so on … It does make organizations sometimes 
potentially a little slow and bureaucratic but it potentially 
guarantees fairness and guarantees that power isn’t abused.” 
(Administrator, interview) 
 
“[Healthcare commissioners needed] some help with doing 
what they called ‘rapid literature reviews’. Now, rapid you 
might think in terms of a few days but in fact, you know, a  
rapid literature review could take months … So, rapid is still 
relatively slow.” (Administrator, interview) 
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Autonomy: GPs 
used to enacting 
high degree of 
discretion 
“It is impossible to change general practice – the only way to 
change it is to have someone who is trusted [by GPs] who says 
"guys, you should stop prescribing ‘crap-o-cilin’" … unless 
you have a champion at each practice, nothing is going to 
change” (GP, observation notes). 
 
“GPs—they are all individual business-people. They have 
huge autonomy over their own practice … You know, they're 
big fish in that pond.” (Administrator, interview) 
Autonomy: 
Administrators 
used to enacting 
low degree of 
discretion 
“Health [care commissioning] seems a very woolly, very 
foggy area in which you want to do something but you don’t 
have the budget to do it and you don’t have the authority to do 
it.” (Administrator, interview) 
 
“From my experience you [as a commissioner] don’t go very 
far without [healthcare provider representatives] turning round 
and saying: 'Actually you [shouldn’t] ask that because that’s 
not in the contract’” (Administrator, interview) 
 
“[We have] very little power and control over what is 
commissioned; how it is commissioned” (Administrator, 
interview) 
Dispositional 
misalignment 
contributes to 
interpreting 
and judging 
others’ 
behavior as 
inappropriate 
GPs interpret 
administrators’ 
behavior as 
slow and 
inefficient 
“If you're just turning up at a meeting to chat, it’s a waste of 
time.” (GP, observation notes)  
 
“I was not impressed actually [with the management 
meetings]. I thought the quality meeting was pointless, [as 
was] the contract meeting afterwards” (GP, interview) 
Administrators 
interpret GPs’ 
behavior as 
ignorant and 
selfish 
“They [GPs] tend to have their pet projects, [rather than 
realizing how these relate to] a budget here potentially of 100 
million or something … They don’t see that yet.” 
(Administrator, interview) 
 
“You know, one GP, was, like, ‘oh, I’m worried about my 
children, and I’ve got this child, and blah, blah, blah, blah, 
blah.’” (Administrator, interview) 
 
“The GPs need to realize that not everything happens 
instantly, that there is a bit of bureaucracy.” (Administrator, 
interview) 
Responding to 
tension in 
accordance 
with 
occupational 
dispositions by 
reducing 
further inter-
occupational 
interaction 
Administrators 
attempt to limit 
GPs’ 
involvement 
rather than 
challenge 
Administrator #3 tells administrator #13 after a multi-
stakeholder meeting that the local GP groups should “really 
start considering the costs of sending GPs to such meetings” 
because it is “not viable to have several GPs constantly attend 
meetings”. GP #2 agrees. (observation notes) 
 
“I tried to redesign the … meetings so that she [a GP] didn't 
have to be involved in quite so much detail” (Administrator, 
interview) 
GPs avoid GPs have stopped attending the bi-weekly contract oversight 
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engagement 
with 
administrators 
rather than seek 
consensus 
meeting. A few months ago the meeting was full of GPs. 
(observation notes) 
 
Administrator #24 notes that GPs no longer attend contract 
negotiation meetings with the largest community care services 
provider in the region. (ethnographic interview) 
Lack of 
effective role 
change 
implementation 
GPs fail to 
develop 
understanding 
of new roles 
“I will be looking to managers to support and advise [GPs 
concerning healthcare commissioning], but I’m not seeing 
much [evidence] of that at the moment.” (Clinical Director) 
 
“I still don't get a sense that they [GPs] understand how a 
Foundation Trust works.” (Administrator, interview) 
 
